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Specialized Parliamentary Bodies and the Quality of Women’s Substantive 
Representation: A Comparative Analysis of Belgium, United Kingdom and New 
Zealand  
 
Abstract 
This comparative analysis investigates formal parliamentary bodies ‘for women’ and more 
informal networks and parliamentary groups (‘gender equality bodies’). These are evaluated 
to determine the extent to which they contribute to a ‘good’ collective process of women’s 
substantive representation. Using interview data, official parliamentary documents, and 
relevant bodies and groups’ websites in three countries (Belgium, United Kingdom and New 
Zealand), we explore which venues are responsive to women in society and which are 
inclusive of a wide variety of claims.  Overall, the United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand 
(NZ) cases score better than Belgium on the responsiveness criterion given that linkage with 
the women’s movement is more or less guaranteed.  When we turn to the criterion of 
inclusiveness of a variety of views and interests, the Belgian and UK systems appear more 
promising than the NZ case, predominantly because of their rules concerning the 
composition of the gender equality bodies.  Nevertheless, in none of the three countries do 
the various bodies constitute a strong site for quality substantive representation of women 
(SRW).  Rather, in the end SRW remains dependent on the role of critical actors. 
 
 
Keywords: substantive representation, women in parliament, parliamentary committees, 
United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand 
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Analysis of women’s substantive representation has been central to gender and politics 
research over more than a decade as scholars have investigated the relationship between 
women’s descriptive and substantive representation (Bolzendahl 2014; Celis et al 2008; 
Dahlerup and Leyenaar 2013; Lovenduski and Gaudagnini 2010; Dovi 2007, 2010). The 
traditional answer to questions relating of the ‘who, how and what’ of women’s substantive 
representation has been women representatives, if not feminist representatives, acting in 
national legislatures, executives and women’s policy agencies acting in a feminist direction.  
Unsurprisingly then, a plethora of global empirical research has documented the relationship 
between women’s descriptive and substantive representation (see Childs and Lovenduski 
2013 for an overview). 
Conceiving of substantive representation in this traditional way has nonetheless 
proven somewhat problematic at both the theoretical and empirical level. First, a focus on 
female representatives rules out the actions of male representatives, revealing an 
essentialism that is troubling (Childs and Krook 2006). Secondly, adopting a feminist 
definition of women’s interests also excludes the claims ‘for women’ that fall outside these 
terms or are articulated by those who are not considered feminist  (Celis and Childs 2012; 
Celis 2012; Childs and Krook 2009; Curtin 2014). Thirdly, a focus on formal elected 
institutions ignores alternative sites and representatives, including formal institutions to 
which women are selected rather than elected (Celis and Childs 2012; Celis et al 2008; 
Curtin 2008; Curtin 2014a). Added to these, questions of accountability and responsiveness 
– of the quality of the representative relationship between the represented and the 
representative – have frequently been marginalized (Severs 2012).  
It is the issue of the quality of the substantive representation of women that is 
addressed here. The quality of the substantive representation of women refers to the extent it 
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is representative of women’s issues and interests and the degree to which it establishes a 
strong representative relationship between the representatives and the represented (Celis and 
Childs 2015). Elsewhere we have argued that gender and politics scholars can gain 
conceptual insight from Saward’s (2010) concept of an economy of claims, where this 
referring to the totality of claims and counter claims that are made by a wide variety of 
actors. Accordingly, the quality of a gendered economy of claims looks to the myriad of 
representative claims made by actors on behalf of women. We suggest ‘good’ substantive 
representation can be measured by three criteria.  The first  assesses the claims voiced by 
women’s representatives (including (women) MPs, political parties, civil society 
organisations, experts, state agencies, celebrities, following Saward 2010), and judges these 
in terms of their representative relationship with women, i.e. the extent to which they are 
responsive to women in society. The key question here is whether the representative claims 
made on behalf of women reflect their actual issues and needs. The second criterion 
addresses the inclusiveness of the claims made for women, and is particularly interested in 
representative claims which are excluded. The economy of gendered claims should be 
inclusive of, and responsive to, women in their diversity, and not only a specific sub-group 
of (likely majority) women and their interests. Hence we are looking for Dodson’s 
‘cacophony of representative claims’ (Dodson, 2006). The third criterion points to the 
relative ‘status’ of representatives’ claims. Here we mean the voices of those represented 
should not only be included, but should also receive equal respect and consideration, and be 
able to generate an effect (Severs 2012).  
But what might such a responsive, inclusive and egalitarian process of substantive 
representation look like ‘on the ground’? How can the quality criteria just introduced be 
operationalized in a specific context, how might they contribute to measuring the quality of 
women’s substantive representation? In this article we approach this operationalization in an 
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inductive fashion while studying ‘women’s parliamentary spaces’. These are, by design, 
established to address women’s issues/interests within the parliament, which is the most 
immediate site for political debate, deliberation and contestation by parliamentarians from a 
range of political parties.  However, while specific actors may be important to specific 
claims at any one point in time, our interest lies in the extent to which women’s spaces 
might further a ‘good’ substantive representation process. Here we limit ourselves to two of 
our three criteria: responsiveness and inclusion.  We do this because these two criteria 
necessarily precede, and are required in order for egalitarianism. 
We offer an analysis of three parliaments of Belgium1, the United Kingdom (UK) 
and New Zealand (NZ), through which to examine these two criteria. Ours is not a most 
similar nor most different design, as the objective is not to generalise about best practice nor 
test specific theoretical claims.  Rather, through our selection of diverse parliamentary 
system, we aim to identify the institutional design features of a range of women’s 
parliamentary bodies that might lead to good substantive representation in three advanced 
democracies with similar socio-economic characteristics. Our sources are drawn from 
official parliamentary documents and records; the institution’s website; email 
correspondence/interviews with institutions’ chairs or administrators; and relevant 
news/internet searches. Limitations of published material restrict the coverage of our 
analysis at this stage to the institutional foundations and formal rules establishing the gender 
equality bodies under scrutiny.  This precludes us, in this paper, from evaluating how the 
women/gender equality bodies function in specific political contexts such as when particular 
parties are in government.   
The following three sections discuss the Belgian, UK and New Zealand cases in 
turn. For each we first give some general information concerning the parliamentary setting 
                                                             
1  For reasons of comparability only national parliaments are researched. 
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and provide information about the women’s/gender parliamentary bodies before evaluating 
the institutional set-up of these bodies using our criteria outlined above. Drawing from a 
range of primary and secondary materials, we offer an exploratory consideration of the 
bodies’ representational activities and relationships and we conclude with an assessment of 
which ‘institutional’ spaces might be considered preferable in progressing quality 
substantive representation of women.  
 
The Belgian case2 
Belgium has a bicameral Parliament at the national level consisting of a Chamber of 
Representatives (the lower house) and the Senate (the upper house). Like all other 
parliaments in Belgium, the Chamber is organized via parliamentary party groups (PPGs) 
and parliamentary committees; both are formally institutionalised and receive logistical 
support (secretariat, offices etc). The committees group MPs according to policy domains 
(for instance, employment, justice, the military), and are linked to the ministerial portfolios. 
All committees are proportionally composed by strength of PPG and membership of a 
committee usually reflects the expertise of MPs, and/or their career goals, as well as the 
preferences of the MPs and their party (Devos 2006; Deschouwer & Hooghe 2005). 
These committees are the key bodies in the parliamentary decision-making process. 
They meet for two full days each week. Their meetings are open to the public and their 
agenda is announced on the website in advance. Core parliamentary law-making and control 
                                                             
2 Sources: Annual Reports of the Chamber, 2010-2012 
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/annualreport/Activiteiten%20bijzondere
%20commissies.pdf consulted on 2 April 2015; Annual Reports of the Chamber  2012-2013 
http://www.lachambre.be/kvvcr/pdf_sections/publications/annualreport/Activiteiten%20BIJZONDER
E%20comm_2012-2013.pdf consulted on 2 April 2015; Annual reports of the Senate consulted 2010-
2011; 2011-2012; 2012-2013;2013-2014 on 2/04/2015 
http://senate.be/www/?MIval=/index_senate&MENUID=14170&LANG=nl; Telephone interview with 
Karin Huybens, Advisor of the Service for Committees of the Chamber of Representatives on 1 April 
2015; with Carine Lalieu, chair of the advisory committee 2013-2014 on 1 April 2015; with Sabine de 
Bethune, chair of the Senate, on 27 March 2015. 
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activities take place in these committee meetings. They discuss, amend and vote on 
legislation, interrogate ministers, and can organise hearings with experts and civil society 
organisations. It is only after a consensus is reached in the committee that the plenary 
parliamentary meeting deliberates and ultimately votes.  
In the Chamber there are five types of committees: fixed, advisory, temporary, extra-
ordinary and inquiry committees. The fixed committees are the most important and reflect 
key ministerial portfolios of which there are eleven. Advisory committees, like fixed 
committees, are established for the entire legislature but deal with policy issues crosscutting 
multiple policy domains that are not per se linked to a specific ministerial portfolio. 
However, in contrast to fixed committees, advisory committees are only able to offer 
advice, and hence wield less power. Alongside these, the other three committee types may 
be constituted to investigate a specific law, deal with specific tasks or investigate in a quasi-
juridical fashion a societal problem. Committees can also meet jointly with other 
committees of the Chamber or the Senate.3  
It is at the committee level where we find formal ‘representation’ of gender-related 
issues.  In the Chamber, there exists the Advisory Committee on Societal Emancipation and 
in the Senate (until 2014) it was the Advisory Committee on Equality for Women and Men, 
while one of the two ‘transversal’ committees also has a mandate to consider issues related 
to gender equality.4  These advisory committees – hereafter the women/gender committees – 
function, and are composed, in the same manner as all other committees (i.e. proportionally 
to the strength of governing as well as oppositional PPGs), with the exception that the 
Chamber’s regulations posit that each party faction with women MPs should ensure at least 
                                                             
3 Since 2014, Senate committees are no longer organized according to policy themes and there are only three 
fixed Senate committees: (i) constitutional affairs, (ii) the Communities ‘transversal’ committee (dealing with 
issues related to the competencies of the communities (i.e. personal matters, like culture and 
education), and (iii) the Regions ‘transversal’ committee (dealing with regional affairs). Only the first 
transversal committee discusses gender equality related themes.. 
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one woman holds a seat on the women/gender committee (article 69). Members of the 
women/gender committees usually join voluntarily in order to represent women and 
women’s interests (Celis and Wauters 2011: 388; Celis and Woodward 2003), so it is not 
surprising that these committees tend to have an overrepresentation of women MPs.  
Nevertheless, some women - even feminists - refrain from becoming members out of fear 
for marginalisation; of not being considered ‘mainstream’ politicians (Celis and Wauters 
2011).  
In terms of activities, between 2010 and 2014 the women/gender committee in the 
Chamber has investigated, amongst other matters, the gender wage gap, political 
participation while on maternity leave, and the UN status of women reports. Over the same 
period the Senate and transversal committees examined the rights of women in Afghanistan, 
the representation of women on company boards, in public institutions and the constitutional 
court, gendering national indicators and social statistics, women and peacekeeping (UN 
Resolution 1325), female genital mutilation, and the UN Platform post-Beijing (this is not a 
comprehensive list). 
However, it is not solely the activities of the committees that we are interested in 
here; rather it is the process by which representation and discussion around these issues 
takes place.  What we see is that in terms of responsiveness, the fact that committee 
meetings, including the women/gender committee and the transversal committees in the post 
2014 Senate, are open to the public potentially increases responsiveness. In theory, women’s 
movement actors and other interested women, can find out about the agenda of the 
committees and attend, and this would count as a positive indicator of responsiveness. In 
practice, however, interviewees noted it is rather exceptional for non-MPs to attend 
committee meetings. 
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Responsiveness is also increased by the rather high accessibility of the 
women/gender committees for MPs with strong ties to the (political) women’s movement. 
In other words, MPs well-versed in women’s perspectives on women’s issues are able to act 
effectively and responsively if they so wish by becoming a member of the gender equality 
committee. Furthermore, even in cases where MPs lack such ties and hence lack the ability 
to tap into these resources, there is always the parliamentary party group (PPG) where 
committee issues are discussed in advance. As such, feminists in the PPG who are not a 
member of the gender equality committee or the women’s sections of the party can inform 
the representative(s) of the PPG regarding issues that are discussed in the women/gender 
committee. Even so, responsiveness may be limited by women/feminist MPs hesitancy to 
become a member of the women/gender committee.  
In terms of inclusiveness, the most significant feature of the Belgian gender equality 
committees seems to be its right to organise hearings on their own initiative. In the period 
studied (2010 – 2015) the women/gender committee in the Chamber (which has 
proportional party membership) organized two such hearings with external actors and the 
Senate organized eleven. External actors invited to the hearings included: representatives of 
feminist and non-feminist women’s organisations and other civil society organisations; 
public officers from departments working on the policies concerned, including gender 
equality policy; and academic and other experts. Committees also have the right to ask for 
external advice and to decide to have joint meetings. Our interviewees stressed that 
representativeness of the participants of the hearings is a central concern although it is not 
formalized as a standing rule. More precisely, a balance is sought by the chair of the gender 
equality body in terms of ideology/religion (for instance when trade unions or university 
experts are invited) and language (participants from the Flemish and Francophone parts of 
Belgium). When the committee decides to organize a hearing the parliamentary parties are 
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asked to suggest participants that should be heard, even if the committee (or in some cases 
the chair) decides whom to actually invite. The invited institutions or individuals are asked 
to prepare a note for the hearing, present their views during the meeting and answer the 
questions of the committee members. In some exceptional cases only written advice is 
included in the hearing. After hearings, committees produce a report that is subsequently 
included in the parliamentary decision-making process. In the case of the joint committee in 
the new Senate, its reports are delivered to the Ministers in charge of gender equality of the 
respective national and sub-state governments and parliaments.  
Such hearings, but also the expert consultations and joint meetings, have then the 
potential to actively seek out and include voices that otherwise are not easily heard. 
Nevertheless, seeking such representativeness is in no way a formal requirement. In 
practice, a plurality of voices is included, including oppositional ones. But analysis of 
hearing participants indicates that it is mostly institutions and strongly organised civil 
society organisations that are included.5 Including marginalized voices does not seem to be 
a priority of the gender equality bodies.6 In addition, the women/gender committees are not 
fixed committees; rather, their status as advisory committees reduces their capacity for 
influence on the broader policy and political agenda of respective governments. 
 
The case of the United Kingdom 
The UK parliament is a bi-cameral institution, in which the lower house, the House of 
Commons takes primacy. Elected by a ‘first past the post’ electoral system the House of 
Commons normally returns single party government, although 2010-2015 saw a 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition. Adversarialism is a key feature of the UK system, 
                                                             
5 See footnote 2 for references 
6 It is the Committee Chair who will make decisions, in consultation with Committee Members, as to who 
takes part.  Whether this is impacted by party membership has not been evaluated here. 
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as it is of Westminster systems- most divisions over legislation are decided along party 
lines.  
A system of departmental select committees in their modern form was introduced in 
1979; as the name implies, these mirror for the most part departments of government.7 A 
Minister for Women at the Cabinet level was introduced following the general election of 
1997, under new Labour, although the post was notably something less than the Ministry of 
Women once advocated by women in the party, and was always a role shared with another 
departmental responsibility (Childs 2004; Annesley and Gains 200?). There was no 
equivalent departmental select committee until summer when aWomen and Equalities 
Committee was belatedly established. Neitehr has the Commons had an institution-wide 
formal women’s caucus; cross party collaboration amongst women MPs were limited to 
informal and usually time specific mobilizations, for example, in defence of abortion 
legislation (Childs 2008).8  In part this reflected the asymmetry of women’s political 
representation amonst women MPs: in the recent past Labour women MPs have 
significantly outnumbered other women MPs, with the Conservative party only significantly 
increasing its number, and still to below 20 percent in 2010 (Childs and Webb 2012). It was 
also the case that inter-party competition over women’s political recruitment, and in 
particular Labour advocacy for and Conservative party rejection of quotas, prevented much 
collaboration on the issue of descriptive representation. Instead, in the period under 
examination there were two types of women’s parliamentary bodies in the UK parliament. 
First, are the All Party Parliamentary Groups (APPGS), of which are number are explicitly 
concerned with women and women’s equality and issues. Nevertheless these should not be 
considered a caucus, in that whilst they are parliament wide, they are officially informal in 
                                                             
7 http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/committees/select/ 
8 For a discussion of this in the aftermath of the 2015 general election see www.policybristol.blogs.bris.ac.uk 
and also http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/women-and-
equalities-committee/ 
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nature.9 The second type of women’s parliamentary body is found within the parties namely, 
the Parliamentary Labour Party’s Women’s Committee (WPLP) which is longstanding since 
the 1980s and relatively institutionalized, and the Parliamentary Conservative Women’s 
Forum (CWF) which was first established in the 2005 Parliament and. Here the focus is on 
the APPGs (see Allen and Childs 2013; Allen and Childs 2015).10 
APPGs are ‘informal, cross-party, interest groups that have no official status within 
Parliament and are not accorded any powers or funding by it’.11 There are two main types – 
country ones, which aim to ‘foster links with other countries and parliaments’, and subject 
groups, which ‘address a particular issue’. A third category much fewer in number, exist 
‘mainly for social reasons’. The Register of All-Party Groups, established in 1985, lists 
those APPGs recognised by Parliament, identifies their officers, and provides information 
about the source and extent of financial and material assistance received from outside 
Parliament. Only registered cross-party groups are recognised by Parliament. They may 
advertise their meetings on the All-Party Notices circulated by the Whips. APPGS take 
priority over unregistered cross-party groups when booking rooms in the Palace of 
Westminster. They may also use the crowned portcullis on their official stationery, reports 
and websites.12  
Membership is open to all Members of the House of Commons and House of 
Lords;13 anyone else may only join at the discretion of the group. In the period of analysis, 
membership had to include at least 20 Members (each of whom must be a Member of the 
House of Commons or House of Lords), comprising: at least 10 Members who are from the 
                                                             
9 All party groups are referred to as APGs and APPGs – here APPGs are used, as this reflects dominant usage. 
10 Later research might well incorporate the workings of the new Women and Equality Committee and 
subjecit to the same kind of analysis.  
11 Groupshttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/register.pdf 
12 Country Groups may be able to affiliate with the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and IPU. 
13 Groups where membership includes persons other than Members of both Houses, use the words ‘Associate 
Parliamentary group’. 
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same political party as the government, and at least 10 who are not from the government 
party (of whom at least 6 must be from the main opposition party), and includes at least one 
officer who is a Member of the House of Commons. A meeting was quorum with three 
members, one of whom is an officer of the group.  
According to the House of Commons (2013) Committee on Standards, Sixth Report 
of Session 2013–14, APPGs provide: a forum for cross-party interaction, which is not 
controlled by the whips; interaction between Commons and Lords Members; a forum for 
parliamentarians, academics, business people, the third sector and other interested parties; 
time and space for policy discussion and debate; and a means for back bench 
parliamentarians to set the policy agenda. This report noted a consensus regarding the 
importance of outside interests being able to access to Members and the sharing of expertise 
(Committee on Standards, 2013, 8, emphasis added).  
Of the nearly 500 Subject APPGs in the UK parliament, two address equalities (1) 
Equalities, and (2) Sexual Equality, whilst six have women in their title: United Nations 
Women; Women and Enterprise; Women in Parliament; Women in the Penal System; 
Women, Peace and Security; Women’s Sport and Fitness.14 Here, we focus in most depth on 
the Equalities and Sexual Equality APPGs.  An initial survey of the six other APPGs with 
‘women’ in their titles their visibility is not high.  Whilst the Parliament pages have links to 
the individual groups’ pages, unless a secretariat is provided by an outside body, there is no 
additional website.15 And even when the secretariat organization has webpages these are not 
necessarily easily found.16 In the 2005-10 Parliament members a new APPG was 
                                                             
14 Another dozen or so subject groups are highly associated with women, for example: women’s health and 
abortion; violence against women; and women’s caring and maternal roles:  
15 See http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/members/apg/. 
16 For more detail on the membership and features of these six groups see K. Celis, S. Childs and J. 
Curtin, ‘Women/Gender Parliamentary Bodies and the Quality of Women’s Substantive 
Representation: A comparative analysis of UK, Belgium and New Zealand, Paper presented at the 
European Conference on Politics and Gender, University of Uppsala, 11-14 June, 2015 
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established, the Women in Parliament APPG. This group, whilst officially cross party as the 
rules of APPGs required, was in practice much less so. Labour Party membership came 
mostly from the Lords, and indeed the then Leader of the Women’s Parliamentary Labour 
Party rejected the overtures of its Chair to become fully involved. Thus, whilst this group 
had   - and indeed has - the potential to become effectively the UK Parliament’s women’s 
caucus, Labour party reluctance is such that at present it remains a much more partial and 
ultimately contested institution. Indeed, whilst some of its members might have claimed to 
‘speak for women’ in the UK House of Commons, the APPG ultimately lacks the legitimacy 
of a caucus of all women.17  It also suffers, like any other APPG, from limitations inherent 
in the status of APPGs. Most importantly, APPGs are ‘partial’ groups and without formal 
Parliamentary status.18 
The purpose of the Equalities APPG is ‘to address discrimination based on all 
equality grounds and seek to advance equal opportunities for all’. 19 It receives secretariat 
support and benefits from the Equality and Diversity Forum (EDF). 20 The Sex Equality 
APPG’s purpose is ‘to campaign for the advancement of sex equality in the UK’.21  It 
receives benefits and secretariat support from two organizations: Platform 51 and The 
Fawcett Society.22 The two equality related APPGs suggest quite distinct foci. The 
Equalities APPG was very much focused on international and national legal equalities 
conventions and formal equalities duties in respect of a range of characteristics including 
sex and gender, whereas the APPG on Sexual Equalities undertook consideration of the 
                                                             
17 Private information.  
18 According to the IPU a women’s caucus can be defined as ‘mechanisms that have been created within 
the parliaments of many countries to strengthen cooperation among women engaged in political life. 
Such caucuses can bring women parliamentarians together across party lines in effective alliances 
around a common goal’. As noted in the text, the APPG has the potential but has not yet realized this 
status. One test of this would be for the women’s PLP to officially engage with the APPG. 
19 http://www.edf.org.uk/ 
20 http://www.edf.org.uk/ 
21 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/sex-equality.htm;  
http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/westminster/party-parliamentary-group-sex-equality/ 
22 http://www.fawcettsociety.org.uk/; http://www.youngwomenstrust.org/ 
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condition and opportunities for women in respect of politics and power, education, 
employment and financial positions. Both APPGs hold meetings with the Minister for 
Women. The Sexual Equality APPG addressed a range of issues from women’s political 
representation, women and financial power; education and social mobility; and 
employment. The Equalities APPG discussed: ICESR, the International Convention on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Health, education, housing, food, and social 
security); the Public Sector Equality Duty;23 and held a joint meeting with APPG ageing, 
disability, race and community. 
Responsiveness to women in civil society is less clear on the basis of the APPGs 
analyzed here, which is what we would want to see in terms of our criteria of analysis. 
However, where an APPG is supported in its secretariat , the civil society groups providing 
that secretariat support experience – or gain -  direct and ongoing access to Parliament. In 
concrete terms, this means that  key personnel from those bodies are able to speakat APPG 
events, which in turn suggests their input into the APPGs’ agenda. Unfortunately, on the 
basis of published data, it is unclear the extent to which other groups can participate in, or 
feed into APPG activities. The lack of a requirement to publish external speakers, one of the 
Committee on Standard’s recommendations, limits analysis in this respect. There is, then, 
significant potential for APPGs to be more outward facing but the failure to require APPGs 
to have a website and to report on meetings, speakers, minutes, reports represents a failure 
to see APPGs as a means to connect with civil society groups and the wider public. 
Although some do this – the APPG on Women in the Penal System is the best example – 
overall there is an unevenness which suggests a limitation of institutionalization.  
                                                             
23 This requires public bodies to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, advance 
equality of opportunity and foster good relations between different people when carrying out their 
activities.’ https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/review-of-public-sector-equality-duty-steering-
group 
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Nevertheless, formal House membership rules are inclusionary; all members of the 
UK Parliament – i.e. both Houses – male and female and from any political party and non 
party members (in the House of Lords) are able to join. As the name implies the groups 
must be ‘all party’. Such rules should ensure that partisan views regarding what is in the 
interests of women are according included. In this way the substantive representation of 
women should be maximized as a diversity of views as carried by attending MPs and Peers 
are in principle included. Membership costs for MPs and Peers are minimal and unlikely to 
be exclusionary. Outside membership is possible, in principle extending APPGs 
inclusiveness, albeit at the discretion of individual groups. However, the two equalities 
APPGs do not appear to have  members from behind on the two Houses of Parliament, as 
was permitted; nor was it possible to determine this for the other six ‘women’s APPGs’.  
The small number of qualifying members – at the time 20 out of 650 in the 
Commons and the more than 800 in the House of Lords, and indeed the low quorum, means 
that in practice APPGs could turn out to be ‘more or less’ one, or two party, with negative 
consequences for  the quality of women’s substantive representation. It is worth noting that 
the APPG Women in Parliament Group initially struggled to find willing Labour party 
women MPs to join.24 As already mentioned, the Chair of the Women’s PLP, Fiona 
McTaggart, was clear that her – and by implication Labour women MPs’ - priorities lay 
with Labour politics and the political recruitment of Labour women MPs25 Ultimately the 
qualifying membership of this group was telling: only two Labour women MPs were 
included; two Labour men and Labour peers made up the necessary six.  
That APPGs are ‘all party’ in design should in principle should limit party 
adversarialism and engender cross-party deliberation. But, again ‘on the ground’ one-party 
                                                             
24 http://labour-uncut.co.uk/tag/appg-women-in-parliament/ 
25 http://labour-uncut.co.uk/tag/appg-women-in-parliament/ 
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might dominate. We have also found that there is significant overlapping memberships 
across numerous ‘women’s’ APPGs. Of the two Equalities and six Women’s APPGs 
considered here, which offers the total of 160 different members, we find, that: one Member 
is a qualifying member of six groups; one Member is qualifying member of four groups; 
three members are qualifying members of three groups; and ten Members are qualifying 
members of two groups. Now, this feature can be read in two ways: first, that a core of 
gender equality activists is extensively involved in a variety of APPGs, and thereby 
powerful players on this issue within Parliament, likely enhancing substantive 
representation. The second, more negative reading is that this group of MPs constitutes a 
‘closed’ group, who claim ‘ownership’ of gender equality.  
 
The New Zealand case 
New Zealand, as a British settler state, inherited a Westminster parliamentary system, 
although there are now significant differences between the UK and New Zealand. From its 
first formation until 1996, the House of Representatives was constituted using a ‘first past 
the post’ electoral system.  However, from 1996 onwards New Zealand elections have 
operated under a multi-member proportional (MMP) electoral system, adapted from the 
German model, which has led to an increase in the number of political parties in parliament. 
Nevertheless, New Zealand’s two largest parties continue to form minority governments, 
dominate the policy agenda, and party discipline remains strong (Curtin and Miller 2010).  
New Zealand’s parliamentary committee system has a long history, although with 
the shift from a plurality to MMP some additional modifications resulted.  Currently, the 
standing select committees are usually organised around areas of government activity, 
determined by ministerial portfolio (there are currently 13 of these), with five specialised 
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standing committees that deal with the regulations and the operation of parliament.26 The 
New Zealand parliament has no dedicated women’s or equality standing committees, and 
parliamentary party women’s caucuses tend to be fluid; in part dependent on the number 
and activism of women MPs within the respective parties.  For the most part, it is the 
Labour Party who have tended to champion women’s representation, descriptively and 
substantively.  However, this has not included establishing a standing committee for 
women.27  At present, the parliamentary Labour Women’s Caucus currently meets about 
once per month, while National (centre right) Party women have worked less consistently as 
a group over time (Gustafson, 1986).28 Moreover, like most Westminster parliaments with 
the heritage of an entrenched two party system, party discipline is strict and enforced.  
Parliamentary norms, such as conscience votes have allowed women to collaborate cross-
party on some legislation, but this is rare rather than the norm.29 
With the introduction of proportional representation, parliamentary committees have 
shown a greater appetite for pursuing inquiries, partly because the government has seldom 
had the numbers on a select committee to prevent it exercising any kind of veto.30  
However, to date this institutional avenue has seldom been pursued as a means to inquire 
into issues concerning gender equality. Over the past seven years, during the terms of both 
                                                             
26 The portfolio of Women’s Affairs is one of 13 areas that sits inside the Government 
Administration Committee. This committee has included the scrutiny of two bills of substantive 
interest to women over the past 10 years: a bill to extend paid parental leave and employment 
protection (2012) and the Marriage Definition Bill (2013).  Both of these were non-government bills 
(members’ bills). The committee also considers the annual budget estimates for the Ministry for 
Women.  http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/sc/details/government-
administration/00DBHOH_BBSC_SCGA_1/business-before-the-government-administration-
committee 
27 However, a standalone Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established by the Labour Government 
in 1984, and still exists, albeit with a less explicitly feminist focus. 
28 Interview with former National Party MP, April 2015. 
29 For example, pornography reform and removal of section 59 of the Crimes Act. 
30 Normally a committee has between six and twelve members each Parties are represented in 
proportion to their seats in the house. Members of committees elect the chair and the chair then 
appoints a deputy. (Effective select committee membership. A guide for members of parliament, pp. 
7-12. Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 2014. www.parliament.nz 
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Labour and National-led governments there have been approximately 40 such inquiries, 
only one of which has investigated an issue identifiable as directly related to women’s 
wellbeing.31 The selection of inquiry topics is dependent upon how important and politically 
significant the committee members consider the topic to be.32  Thus, in part the substantive 
representation of women through committee inquiries may be dependent on the presence of 
(feminist) women on such committees, although a systematic gender analysis of New 
Zealand’s parliamentary committee composition and business has yet to be undertaken. 
Whether the recommendations made by such committees are taken up is dependent on the 
government of the day, but where sufficient public input and pressure for change has 
accompanied the inquiry there appears to have been some success in policy reform (Palmer 
et al 2004: 170-172). 
In addition to these formal committees, there are a range of informal cross-party 
groups which tend to be ‘issue’ based. These groups are voluntary, and may or may not be 
supported by a parliament-based secretariat (there are currently eight such groups).  Usually 
the chair is a member of the government and the co-chair or deputy chair is from an 
opposition party.  Chairs are elected by the members of the group, membership is voluntary 
and the size of these groups fluctuates over time. Two of these —the New Zealand 
Parliamentarians’ Group on Population and Development, (NZPPD), and the 
Commonwealth Women Parliamentarians (NZCWP) have a recent history of addressing 
gender equality issues.  
                                                             
31 This was the Inquiry into the Funding of Specialist Sexual Violence Social Services, chaired by the Social 
Services Committee in 2013. 
32 Inquiries are generally initiated by committees themselves but can also be referred from the 
House. Decisions on matters relating to inquiries and other business are usually made by consensus, 
although may be put to a vote if there is disagreement.   
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The NZPPD is a voluntary cross-party group of parliamentarians who share an 
interest in increasing awareness of and a desire to prioritize sexual and reproductive health 
and rights issues in the Pacific region.  Established in 1998 to further the achievement of the 
Programme of Action developed at the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD) NZPPD regularly engages with counterparts, in particular from the 
Asia-Pacific region. The group holds quarterly meetings and within its objectives there is a 
strong emphasis on sustainable development and the status of women as well as 
reproductive rights.  The Pacific is the geographical focus area of NZPPD while Family 
Planning NZ provides secretariat support for NZPPD; resources for the Secretariat are 
provided in part from UNFPA.   
The New Zealand Group of Commonwealth Women Parliamentarians (NZCWP) is 
part of the New Zealand branch of Commonwealth Parliamentarians Association (CPA). As 
with the NZPPD, NZCWP is a voluntary group of women parliamentarians from all parties. 
The group has co-chairs: one from the governing party and one from the opposition. 
Secretariat functions are provided by the parliament, specifically by the Parliamentary 
Relations and Education team in the Office of the Clerk. Funding for the Pacific Region 
Network, of which NZ is a member, is fund by the CPA. The main focus of the NZCWP 
continues to be the promotion of women’s parliamentary representation of women, 
especially in the Pacific, and to represent women parliamentarians’ views and concerns, as 
well as those of their constituents.33   
Any parliamentarian who supports the aims and objectives of these groups may 
make a written application to the Secretariat for membership. Membership is usually 
                                                             
33 The NZCWP has its own rules which sets out its terms of reference and it is always co-chaired by a 
government and opposition member. The members set the agenda with co-chairs driving the strategic 
objectives- it is a non partisan space for women MPs, and they can invite women’s groups to provide advice. 
The work of the NZCWP is relatively nascent and no independent web presence for reports exists as yet. 
However, inter-parliamentary activities of NZCWP are reported on and then tabled in parliament. and 
available via the parliament webiste (Interview with Parliamentary Services, April 2015).   
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granted on the approval of two-thirds of the members. However in practice membership 
recruitment is not this formal and to-date approving membership has not been an issue. In 
the case of the NZCWP, membership is restricted to women members of parliament. 
Membership is not open to the public, but NZPPD is outward looking, in part because its 
secretariat services are provided by a civil society organization and its funding is provided 
by an international NGO (the United Nations Population Fund).  For example, the 
Secretariat may suggest a guest presentation from a community group if the topic aligns 
with the objectives of NZPPD.  Open hearings are also an avenue used to bring MPs from 
the region together with academic experts, Pacific community service organizations, 
educators, researchers.   
The membership of NZCWP is also limited to parliamentarians but is open to 
discussions with women’s movement organizations when appropriate. Moreover, its goal of 
increasing women’s representation in parliament necessarily requires it to engage with 
women’s groups in discussions around strategies for the recruitment of women. In addition, 
the second objective of the NZCWP is intentionally broad (i.e. to represent women 
parliamentarians’ views and concerns).  Potentially, this allows women parliamentarians 
who are members to bring issues to meetings which may then become part of the NZCWP 
policy agenda.34  Both cross-parliamentary groups have considerable autonomy in setting 
their substantive agenda. However, there is an expectation that all members of the group 
will agree to the set of issues to be pursued by the group. This precludes any claims being 
raised that may be subject to government policy or which may have budgetary implications. 
 
Comparing the Belgian, NZ and UK cases 
                                                             
34 One issue currently under consideration by the NZCWP is marriage law, and age of consent for NZ female 
residents who travel overseas for arranged marriages prior to the current NZ age of 18.  
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In the Tables below we compare the UK, Belgian NZ parliamentary bodies (APPGs, 
committees, groups and venues) concerned with women/gender. Features that positively 
contribute to the quality criterion that guide our analysis are indicated with a ‘+’; features 
that impact negatively are indicated with a ‘-’.  
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
 
In the New Zealand case, there are no dedicated women’s / gender standing committees, 
only women’s party groups and parliamentary ‘issue’ groups. Whether ordinary committees 
address gender depends on who sits on them. That said, the NZPPD is a more outward 
looking body. Although membership is still limited to parliamentarians, civil society can be 
invited in, and it receives external secretariat support.  NZCWP membership is limited to 
parliamentarians and is not in close discussion with women’s movement organizations but it 
is looking to expand its reach and issues. Accordingly, we might suggest that these ‘issue’ 
groups offer potential for women in conservative parties who are liberal (feminist) in 
orientation to undertake work on women’s issues that are not part of their parties’ policy 
platform.  However, quality representation through these venues appears contingent at best. 
In the UK and NZ cases, all MPs, including those with links with women’s 
movements can join the women/gender bodies, on their own initiative. In Belgium, in 
contrast, membership is limited and parties decide on who becomes a member. This implies 
that MPs with links with women’s movements can be either included or excluded; the latter 
a possibility in the case of parties that resist gender equality reforms, which may in turn 
lower levels of responsiveness; or progressive parties may choose to  Moreover, all MPs 
may have to refrain from voicing women’s movement interests when they conflict with their 
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party line, irrespective of their links with women’s organisations. In the UK and NZ such 
women/gender bodies are free from party whips. However, in the NZ case it is rare for 
issues to reach the agenda if the respective parties have an explicit position on that issue. 
Given that in the UK and NZ civil society organisations (that have connections with the 
women’s movement) offer critical resource support to at least one of the women/gender 
bodies, linkage with the women’s movement is more or less guaranteed, even if this relies 
on informal rather than formal associations/rules, and may be limited in the diversity of 
groups included. There is no such guarantee in the Belgian case. Women’s movement 
representatives can be included through hearings, but there exists no obligation to hear from 
the women’s movement. The only feature that seems to increase responsiveness in a 
stronger way in the Belgian case as compared to the UK and NZ ones, is that the agenda and 
the documents of the women/gender bodies in Belgium are easily accessible: women in civil 
society have access to information about when and how women’s interests are represented. 
Moreover, the committee meetings are public. The low level of external communication in 
the UK and NZ cases is rather problematic in light of establishing responsiveness.  
When we turn to the criterion of inclusiveness of a variety of views and interests, the 
Belgian and UK system seems more promising than the NZ one, with Belgium ranking 
above the UK. This is foremost the case because in the Belgian and UK parliaments the 
rules concerning the composition of the gender equality bodies are more strict when it 
comes to the inclusion of all elected parties, governing as well as oppositional ones. 
Because members self-select into the parliamentary groupings in NZ there is no guarantee 
that all parties are represented. The greater internal orientation of the women/gender bodies 
in the UK and NZ constitute a likely limitation for including extra-parliamentary voices, in 
that there is limited communication with groups outside parliament, as already noted. In 
Belgium women and women’s movement organisations have the greater possibility –albeit 
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foremost hypothetical- to anticipate exclusion and for instance (threaten to) approach the 
press, parties or individual MPs. In all three cases the women/gender bodies can consult or 
invite in other/marginal voices –through outside membership (in Belgium), through 
secretariat support (UK) and hearings or presentations (in New Zealand) – but none of them 
provides guarantees or incentives to put this into practice.  
 
Conclusions 
The UK and NZ women/gender bodies appear to constitute only a limited model for ‘good’ 
substantive representation of women. They are not currently required or designed to provide 
extensive inclusion from civil society; they lack the capacity to develop such links, unless 
they are well resourced by a civil society group which in turn would need to be committed 
to seek out wider civil society participation.  They constitute then, more of an intra-
institution forum, with some outside links. So they can – at best- create a space for women’s 
issues to be raised within the parliamentary arena, and to make some links with outside 
interests. But as more of a body ‘for women’ in both the UK and NZ parliaments, they fall 
short of an institutionalized conduit for, and deliberative forum of women’s interests from 
outside in. Where the women/gender bodies better fulfil these criteria, this is largely 
dependent upon the personal commitment and capacities of the Chair working with their 
Secretariat. To achieve ‘good’ SRW, a range of additional measures would be likely 
required in these two cases, not least: increased institutional capacity; a requirement for 
annual reporting of events; rules or terms of reference that facilitate more systematic 
inclusion of, or consultation with, civil society organisations, and better use of websites and 
public meetings. 
The Belgian case looks in comparison more promising. The key positive features of 
the Belgian women’s/gender bodies are the ones that guarantee inclusiveness and equal 
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treatment of a variety of perspectives and views. Basically, these are a side-effect of the 
Belgian PR system: the fact that all parties need to be proportionally included in all layers of 
decision-making, including in the parliamentary bodies seems –at least theoretically- to 
provide the most promising conditions for good substantive representation of women, 
although the same cannot be said of the PR system in New Zealand. This partially supports 
contentions that PR may be positively associated with the DRW. That said, the level of 
formalization that comes along with the PR system in Belgium impacts negatively on the 
responsiveness of women’s substantive representation in the women’s/gender bodies. 
However, it appears to lead to lesser guarantees for linkage with women’s movements in 
comparison with the UK case, which more is more grassroots in nature but wields less 
power. Stronger links with the women’s movement and women in society would thus be key 
to enhanced SRW via Belgian women/gender parliamentary bodies. Here, the system of 
hearings seems to be a tool that can be re-designed and better operationalized.   
Good substantive representation is no longer - if it ever was – about the presence of 
feminist representatives acting within legislatures. Conceived of as a process, 
women/gender parliamentary bodies can be considered to constitute one site and judged 
against our three criteria: responsiveness, inclusiveness, and equality and egalitarianism. 
Applying such criteria to our three cases – the UK Parliament, Belgium and New Zealand, 
we have found variation. Our analysis to date do not suggest a robust conclusion that the 
institutional arrangements underpinning any of these women/gender parliamentary bodies 
constitute a strong site for good SRW. Indeed, in all three parliaments whether the 
substantive representation occurs looks to remain very much dependant on the role of 
critical actors therein.  This means that political parties and individual women 
parliamentarians may prove important to the content and operation of such site.  
Accordingly, and recognizing the preliminary nature of our empirical analysis, this paper 
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prompts both additional research and foregrounds the question of the further 
institutionalization of women/gender parliamentary committees as an appropriate strategy 
for good SRW.  
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Table 1 Comparing responsiveness  
 
  
Belgium 
 
 
United Kingdom 
 
 
New Zealand 
 
Responsiveness 
‘Are the claims 
included in the 
process of SRW 
responsive to 
women in 
society?’ 
 
 
Membership 
+ : committee membership reflects 
the ambitions of the MPs  
- : Membership is limited, possibly 
excluding feminists/MPs with ties 
to women’s movement 
- : parties decide on membership 
 
Ideology 
- : MPs follow party line 
 
 
 
 
Civil society links 
+ : possible through 
hearings/individual MPs 
- : no guarantees for such a link 
 
 
 
Activities’ visibility 
+ : external communication (agenda 
and main documents online) 
+ : committee meetings are public 
 
 
Membership 
+ : All MPs with links with women’s 
movements can become a member 
+ : Membership on own initiative 
+: APPGs must have membership from 
‘all parties’ 
 
 
Ideology 
+ : APPG members are free of party 
whip 
 
 
 
Civil society links 
+ : where APPGs are supported by civil 
society groups providing secretariat 
resources 
 
 
 
Activities’ visibility 
- : low external communication 
 
 
Membership  
+ : All MPs can become a member 
+ : Membership on own initiative 
- : Are not required to have membership 
from ‘all parties’ 
 
 
 
Ideology 
+ : GS CPGs members free of party 
whip 
- : Agenda items restricted to policy 
issues on which all members can agree  
 
Civil society links 
+ : through hearings/individual MPs 
- : no guarantees for such a link 
+ : where GS CPGs are supported by 
civil society groups providing 
secretariat resources 
 
Activities’ visibility 
- : informal, not through parliamentary 
channels 
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Table 2 Comparing inclusiveness 
 
 Belgium United Kingdom New Zealand 
 
Inclusiveness 
‘Is the process 
of SRW 
inclusive of all/ 
a wide variety 
of claims?’ 
 
Membership 
+ : in theory and practice: all parties 
represented in proportion to the 
number of seats 
 
 
 
Civil Society links 
+ : possible and actively sought 
through hearings 
- : dominance of some civil society 
organisations possible particularly 
well-organized and stronger 
organizations 
 
Activities 
+ : external communication: agenda 
and main documents online 
+ : committee meetings are public 
Membership 
+ : in theory: all MPs (male/female; 
party/non-party; outside members; both 
Houses)  
- : in practice: dominance of one party 
possible 
 
Civil Society links 
+ : possible through outside members  
- : dominance of civil society 
organisations supporting the APPG 
(excluding others) high risk 
 
 
 
Activities 
- : low external communication 
 
Membership 
+ : in theory all MPs (male/female; 
major/minor party)  
-: dominance of one party possible but 
unlikely to impact due to sharing of 
chair/deputy/co-chair roles 
 
Civil Society links 
+ : possible through hearings, guest 
speakers, expert evidence 
- : dominance of some civil society 
organisations is theoretically possible 
 
 
 
Activities 
+ : external communication: agenda and 
main documents online 
+ : press releases on major events 
- : committee meetings by invitation 
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